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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sara M. Showen appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction for possession
of a controlled substance. She challenges the district court's denial of her motion to suppress
methamphetamine found in her purse. She argues her consent for the police to search her purse
was invalid because she was unlawfully seized at the time. Due to her invalid consent, the district
court should have granted her motion to suppress. Therefore, she respectfully requests this Court
vacate her judgment of conviction, reverse the district court's order denying her motion to
suppress, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the middle of the day, Officer Taylor and Officer Dunham assisted two Health and
Welfare social workers with a welfare check on a teenage girl at her home regarding allegations
of abuse. (Tr.,1 p.63, Ls.2-7.) The officers were not conducting an independent police
investigation. (Tr., p.17, L.19-p.18, L.4.) The girl lived in the house with her grandmother, and
Ms. Showen lived in a shop in the backyard. (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-20.) Ms. Showen was not
connected to the welfare check. (Tr., p.19, Ls.8-10, p.29, Ls.12-17, p.45, Ls.1-10.)
Before the officers and social workers got to the front door of the house, Ms. Showen
walked out the door with a plate of food. (State's Ex. 1, 00:55; Tr., p.63, Ls.8-17.) She was

1

The transcripts of four hearings are contained in one document. The first transcript contains the
preliminary hearing, held on June 29, 2018. It is seventeen pages. After this transcript, the
internal pagination of the document (in the center of each page) starts over at page one and
continues for the next three transcripts: the motion to suppress hearing, held on November 8,
2018, the change of plea hearing, held on November 19, 2018, and the sentencing hearing, held
on January 25, 2019. Citations to these three transcripts will use its internal pagination, and line
numbers, with the designation "Tr." The preliminary hearing transcript is not cited herein.
1

leaving to bring food to her fiance and his mother,2 who was in the hospital. (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-17,
p.63, Ls.18-21.) Upon Ms. Showen exiting the house, Officer Dunham told her why they were
there and asked her to go back inside. (Tr., p.35, Ls.15-17, p.36, Ls.1-3, p.42, Ls.19-21.)
Ms. Showen complied. (Tr., p.36, Ls.4-5.) Ms. Showen unlocked the front door, and the officers
and social workers followed her in. (State's Ex. 1, 1:17-1:44.) Officer Taylor directed her to
move to the left of the door so they could all enter the home. (State's Ex. 1, 1:47-1:50; see also
Tr., p.10, Ls.2-15.) Officer Taylor asked her questions about who she was going to see, who was
in the hospital and for how long, if she still lived in the shop, and her last name. (State's Ex. 1,
1:58-2:30; Tr., p.26, Ls.17-25.) At some point, Officer Dunham started asking Ms. Showen
questions. (State's Ex. 1, 3:07-3:38.) Officer Taylor later asked, "Sara, are you on probation
yet?," and she responded, "I'm on unsupervised." (State's Ex. 1, 3:38-3:42; see Tr., p.27, Ls.17.) Officer Dunham and a social worker were standing between Ms. Showen and the front door
in a kitchen area. (See State's Ex. 1, 4:19--4:21.) The kitchen was "a pretty small area, so [they]
were fairly close" to each other. (Tr., p.43, Ls.22-25.)
Sometime within the next two minutes, Ms. Showen admitted to Officer Dunham and the
social worker that she would fail a drug test. (State's Ex. 1, 5:50-6:13; Tr., p.37, Ls.10-20, p.64,
Ls.3-21.) She explained that she had eaten methamphetamine in the house. (State's Ex. 1, 5:506:13; Tr., p.37, Ls.10-20, p.64, Ls.3-21.) Officer Dunham told Ms. Showen that he wanted to
make sure it was a safe home and asked to look around the shop, and Ms. Showen started to walk
to the front door of the house to take him to the shop. (State's Ex. 1, 6:10-6:18; see also
Tr., p.38, Ls.15-18, p.23, Ls.3-12, p.65, Ls.3-7.) As Ms. Showen was going to the front door,
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Ms. Showen's fiance was the teenage girl's father, and the allegation was that he has physically
abused her. (R., pp.62, 68; see also Tr., p.45, Ls. I-I 0.) Apparently, these allegations were not
pursued further. (R., p.62.)
2

Officer Taylor ordered her, "Hand that to me. We don't need to take that out there. Thank you,"
and took the plate of food from Ms. Showen. (State's Ex. 1, 6: 17-6:23; Tr., p.11, Ls.19-25, p.65,
Ls.8-21.) Officer Dunham and Ms. Showen then left the house for the shop. (Tr., p.39, Ls.6-8.)
Once in the shop, Officer Dunham and Ms. Showen went up a ladder to the second floor
loft area. (Tr., p.40, Ls.1-25.) Ms. Showen went ahead of Officer Dunham on the ladder, and
Officer Dunham stood at the top of the ladder and looked around the loft. (Tr., p.40, L.14-p.41,
L.9.) Ms. Showen could not go back down unless Officer Dunham went down first. (See
Tr., p.40, Ls.12-15, p.41, Ls.1-9.) The shop had only one entrance, a "garage-type," "roll-up
door." (Tr., p.15, Ls.15-20, p.48, Ls.4-6.)
After a few minutes, Officer Taylor met Officer Dunham and Ms. Showen in the shop.
(Tr., p.12, L.15-p.13, L.4, p.65, L.22-p.66, L.1.) Officer Taylor stood right by the ladder as
Officer Dunham and Ms. Showen came down. (State's Ex. 1, 9:08-9:52.) Officer Taylor then
asked Ms. Showen to search her purse. (Tr., p.14, L.25-p.15, L.2, p.66, Ls.14-21; State's Ex. 1,
9:58-10:02.) Ms. Showen agreed. (Tr., p.15, Ls.3-4, p.66, L.22; see State's Ex. 1, 9:58-10:02.)
Once Officer Taylor got consent, she told Ms. Showen to sit down on the ladder. (State's Ex. 1,
10:10-10:16.) Officer Taylor found methamphetamine in a candy wrapper in Ms. Showen's
purse and arrested her. (See R., pp.17, 64, 71.)
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging Ms. Showen committed the cnme of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(l).
(R., pp.11-12.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the offense

and bound Ms. Showen over to district court. (R., pp.36-38, 39.) The State charged Ms. Showen
by Information with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.44-45.)
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Ms. Showen filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.60-61.) She argued her warrantless
search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.60-61.) In her brief in support, Ms. Showen argued
she was unlawfully seized when she consented to Officer Taylor's search of her purse and,
therefore, her consent was invalid. (R., pp.65-66.) The State opposed the motion. (R., pp.68-77.)
The State argued: ( 1) the entire encounter between Ms. Showen and the officers was consensual;
(2) if the officers did seize Ms. Showen, they had reasonable suspicion of injury to child upon
Ms. Showen's admission to methamphetamine use; and (3) Ms. Showen voluntarily consented to
the search, even if she was unlawfully seized. (R., pp.71-76.)
At the hearing, Officer Taylor and Officer Dunham testified. (See Tr., p.24, L.11-p.50,
L.9.) The district court admitted Officer Taylor's body cam video. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-3.) Relevant
here, Officer Taylor testified that, upon Ms. Showen' s admission to past methamphetamine use,
Officer Taylor became concerned about "the drug use in the home" with the teenage girl and
suspected the offense of injury to a child. (Tr., p.21, L.21-p.22, L.7, p.24, Ls.1-3, p.27, Ls.1720.) Similarly, Officer Dunham testified that he shared Officer Taylor's concern about injury to
child due to Ms. Showen's past use statement. (Tr., p.45, Ls.11-22.) Despite this concern,
Officer Taylor testified that she had no physical evidence of drug use around the teenager or any
evidence of Ms. Showen's care or control over the teenager. (Tr., p.28, L.22-p.29, L.2.)
Further, neither officer talked to the teenager. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-11; see Tr., p.45, Ls.20-22
(Officer Dunham's concern arose solely from Ms. Showen's admission).) Officer Taylor also
testified that she believed that she had detained Ms. Showen upon her order to give her the plate
of food. (Tr., p.28, Ls.11-21, p.30, Ls.2-10.) There was no evidence that either officer suspected
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Ms. Showen was currently under the influence of methamphetamine. (See Tr., p.24, L.11-p.50,
L.9 (officers' testimony).)
After this evidence, the State argued Ms. Showen voluntarily consented to the search of
her purse. (Tr., p.51, Ls.7-25, p.54, Ls.6-11.) The State also argued Ms. Showen was never
seized, and she could have left at any time. (Tr., p.54, Ls.12-18.) If Ms. Showen was seized by
Officer Taylor's order to leave the food and Officer Dunham's request to go to the shop, the
State asserted the officers had reasonable suspicion of injury to a child because Ms. Showen
admitted to past drug use. (Tr., p.54, L.18-p.55, L.16.) The State further asserted, assuming a
lawful seizure, Ms. Showen's consent during the seizure was voluntary. (Tr., p.56, Ls.1-10.) In
response, Ms. Showen argued "there are a number of different spots throughout this encounter"
when she was seized: during her attempt to leave the property upon the officers' arrival, when
she was ordered to leave her food, and once she was inside the shop. (Tr., p.56, L.21-p.57, L.24,
p.58, L.23-p.59, L.3, p.59, L.9-p.61, L.1.) Ms. Showen also argued the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion and her consent was not voluntary due to the illegal seizure. (Tr., p.57,
L.24-p.58, L.22, p.59, Ls.3-8.)
At the end of the hearing, the district court orally denied the motion. Although Officer
Taylor believed she had detained Ms. Showen, the district court reasoned the test was "of a
reasonable person," and not the officers' subjective view. (Tr., p.67, Ls.1-9.) The district court
found Officer Dunham's tone with Ms. Showen was calm and conversational. (Tr., p.67, Ls.914.) In contrast, the district court found Officer Taylor's tone was "very clipped" and "somewhat
abrasive." (Tr., p.66, Ls.10-11.) The district court also found Officer Taylor gave no commands
except for "the command to leave the food." (Tr., p.66, Ls.11-13.) Examining the totality of the
circumstances, the district court determined Ms. Showen went to the shop with Officer Dunham
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and "that at no point" was she detained. (Tr., p.67, Ls.19-20.) The district court further held,
because Ms. Showen was not detained, she voluntarily consented to Officer Taylor's request to
search her purse. (Tr., p.67, L.22-p.68, L. 1.) In the alternative, the district court held the officers
had reasonable suspicion "that a crime could have occurred or could be occurring based upon the
response of [Ms. Showen] in the home," so any detention was lawful and Ms. Showen's consent
was valid. (Tr., p.68, Ls.2-9.) Shortly thereafter, the district court issued a written order denying
the motion for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing. (R., p.88.)
Ms. Showen entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance.
(Tr., p.71, Ls.16-23, p.72, Ls.13-17, p.73, L.24-p.74, L.13.) She reserved the right to appeal the
district court's denial of her motion to suppress. (R., p.95.) The district court sentenced her to
probation for two years, with an underlying sentence of three years, with one and one-half years
fixed. (Tr., p.88, Ls.17-21.) Ms. Showen timely appealed from the district court's judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.102-04, 109-11.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Showen' s motion to suppress evidence found in her
purse during her unlawful seizure?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Showen's Motion To Suppress Evidence Found In
Her Purse During Her Unlawful Seizure

A.

Introduction
Ms. Showen argues the district court should have granted her motion to suppress the

evidence found in her purse because her illegal seizure invalided her consent. She asserts the
officers seized her during three instances in the encounter: when the officers asked her to go back
into the house as she was trying to leave the property, when the officers asked to go to the shop
and took her food, and when the officers were in the shop. She further argues, throughout this
encounter, the officers never developed reasonable suspicion to justify their seizure. Because the
seizure was unlawful, Ms. Showen's consent to search her purse when seized was invalid.
Accordingly, the district court should have granted her motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court." Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free review of "the trial court's
application of constitutional principles to the facts found." Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. As such,
determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,
111 (2013)(citing State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127 (2010)).
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C.

The District Court Erred By Ruling The Officers Did Not Seize Ms. Showen Because
She Was Not Free To Leave During The Encounter
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. "Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees
that '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."' State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886
(2015) (alteration in original); see also IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 17. A warrantless seizure is
presumptively unreasonable, unless the State shows the seizure fits within a well-established
exception to the warrant requirement. Green, 158 Idaho at 886-87; see also Halen v. State, 136
Idaho 829, 833 (2002) ("When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the
State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is
applicable."); Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570 (same). The defense, however, has the burden to prove a
seizure occurred. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004).
"The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is an
objective one, evaluating whether under the totality of the circumstances 'a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' State v.

Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)). "A
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or
other public place and asks a few questions." State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)). "So long as police do
not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required, the encounter is deemed
'consensual' and no reasonable suspicion is required." Id.
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On the other hand, a seizure occurs “when an officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen.” State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App.
2011).
Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the person did
not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.
Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). “The critical
question is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not at liberty
to ignore the police presence and go about his or her business.” State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho
180, 184 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479 (Ct. App. 1999)).
Here, Ms. Showen argues the totality of the circumstances establish three different
instances where the officers seized her. First, she was seized when Officer Dunham and Officer
Taylor, accompanied by two social officers, asked her to go back inside the house as she was
trying to leave the property. Second, in the alternative, she was seized when Officer Dunham
asked to search the shop and Officer Taylor took her plate of food. Third, again in the alternative,
she was seized when both officers questioned her and looked around the shop. In each instance, a
reasonable person would not feel free to ignore the officers and go about her business.
Looking at the first instance, Officer Dunham and Officer Taylor seized Ms. Showen as
she was exiting the house to bring food to her fiancé and his mother at the hospital. As
Ms. Showen was leaving her house, she was confronted by two uniformed police officers, along
with two social workers. (State’s Ex. 1, 00:55; Tr., p.63, Ls.8–17.) Officer Dunham and the two
social workers were in front of her, and Officer Taylor was behind her. (State’s Ex. 1, 00:55–
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1:13) There is no evidence that Ms. Showen knew of their pending arrival. Further, Ms. Showen
was clearly intending to leave the property—she had jacket on, a wrapped plate of food, keys in
her hand, and a purse. (State’s Ex. 1, 00:55–1:21.) There was no evidence that Officer Dunham
gave Ms. Showen the option to leave and deliver the food. Instead, Officer Dunham asked her to
go back inside the house. (Tr., p.35, Ls.15–17, p.36, Ls.1–3, p.42, Ls.19–21.) Although Officer
Dunham framed this as a “request,” no reasonable person in the situation would believe that she
was at liberty to ignore it. In light of the totality of the circumstances, Ms. Showen argues this
first encounter was a seizure because Officer Dunham and Officer Taylor conveyed that
Ms. Showen’s compliance with their request to go back into the house was required.
Next, if this first encounter was not a seizure, then Officer Dunham’s and Officer
Taylor’s conduct amounted to seizure when they asked Ms. Showen to search the shop and took
her food. After Ms. Showen admitted that she would fail a drug test, Officer Dunham
“requested” to look around the shop. (State’s Ex. 1, 6:10–6:18; see also Tr., p.38, Ls.15–18,
p.23, Ls.3–12, p.65, Ls.3–7.) The shop was Ms. Showen’s home. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.11–16.) At
the time of Officer Dunham’s request, Ms. Showen was cornered in a small kitchen area with
Officer Dunham and a social worker blocking her exit. (See State’s Ex. 1, 1:37–6:16.) Officer
Taylor was nearby. (See State’s Ex. 1, 1:37–6:16.) Once Ms. Showen started to leave to take
Officer Dunham to her living area, Officer Taylor ordered to give her the plate of food. (State’s
Ex. 1, 6:17–6:23; Tr., p.11, Ls.19–25, p.65, Ls.8–21.) The district court found Officer Taylor’s
tone was “very clipped” and “somewhat abrasive.” (Tr., p.66, Ls.10–11.) Moreover, Officer
Taylor believed that she had detained Ms. Showen upon her command. (Tr., p.28, Ls.11–21,
p.30, Ls.2–10.) Setting Officer Taylor’s intent aside, Officer Taylor’s taking of the food would
communicate to a reasonable person that she is no longer able to leave and deliver that food. It is

11

an implicit command to stay. Looking at the totality of the circumstances here, including the
officers’ prior conduct when Ms. Showen first tried to leave the house, no reasonable person
would feel free to decline Officer Dunham’s and Officer Taylor’s requests and terminate the
encounter.
Finally, if these first two interactions still were not seizures, the third interaction was.
Once both officers and Ms. Showen were in her living area, she was seized by them. By that
time, the officers had stopped Ms. Showen from leaving the property, questioned her in the small
kitchen, taken the food that she going to bring to her fiancé and his mother at the hospital,
followed her into her living area, and then questioned her again while searching the area. In the
shop, Officer Dunham showed authority by following behind Ms. Showen on the ladder so she
could not go down without him going down first. (See Tr., p.40, Ls.12–15, p.41, Ls.1–9; State’s
Ex. 1, 8:11–9:58.) And, once Officer Taylor got in the shop, she immediately started looking
around and examining items, including a pill bottle. (State’s Ex. 1, 8:24–9:11.) About nine
minutes had passed since Ms. Showen first exited the front door of the house, and the officers
showed no signs of leaving. (See State’s Ex. 1, 00:55–9:58.) Taking into account all of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would understand that Officer Dunham and Officer Taylor
conveyed compliance and would not allow her to terminate the encounter.
In summary, the district court erred by ruling Ms. Showen was not seized at any point
during her interaction with Officer Dunham and Officer Taylor. (See Tr., p.67, Ls.1–20.) The
officers did, in fact, seize Ms. Showen at three instances during the encounter: when the officers
prevented her from leaving the property, when Officer Dunham asked to go to her living area
and Officer Taylor took her food, and when the officers searched her living area and continued to
question her. These were seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
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D.

The District Court Erred By Ruling Any Seizure Was Lawful Because Ms. Showen's
Admission To Past Drug Use Did Not Create Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity
Because the officers seized Ms. Showen, the officers must have had reasonable suspicion

to justify the seizure. There are no facts to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at
any time before Officer Taylor's search of Ms. Showen's purse.
"Under the Fourth Amendment, 'limited investigatory detentions, based on less than
probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion
that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime."' State v. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 628
(2019) (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) ). "Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those
facts." Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811). "[A]n officer may take into
account his experience and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,"
Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, but "[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something

more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' United States v. Sako/ow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same). "The test for reasonable suspicion is
based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop."
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112.

Here, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Ms. Showen during any of
the three seizures. First, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
allow their seizure of Ms. Showen as she exited the front door to leave the property. The officers
testified that they went to the home for the sole purpose of assisting the social workers with a
welfare check. (Tr., p.63, Ls.2-7.) The officers were not conducting a police investigation, and,
more importantly, Ms. Showen was not implicated in any way with the welfare check. (Tr., p.17,
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L.19–p.18, L.4; p.19, Ls.8–10, p.29, Ls.12–17, p.45, Ls.1–10.) There were no facts at this time to
establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Ms. Showen.
Next, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity upon
Ms. Showen’s admission to past drug use. The evidence showed that Ms. Showen admitted that
she would fail a urinalysis test. (State’s Ex. 1, 5:50–6:13; Tr., p.37, Ls.10–20, p.64, Ls.3–21.)
The evidence also showed that she admitted to ingesting methamphetamine in the house. (State’s
Ex. 1, 5:50–6:13; Tr., p.37, Ls.10–20, p.64, Ls.3–21.) But, the evidence did not show when
Ms. Showen used methamphetamine. The district court found it could not “say that she actually
it used it that day.”3 (Tr., p.64, Ls.13–15.) Moreover, neither officer testified to any indication
that Ms. Showen was currently under the influence of methamphetamine. And, when asked about
reasonable suspicion, neither officer claimed suspicion of drug-related crimes, such as
possession of a controlled substance or paraphernalia. Ms. Showen’s admission to prior drug use,
with nothing more, was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See State v. Reynolds,
143 Idaho 911, 916 (Ct. App. 2007) (officer’s knowledge of defendant’s prior drug use, and
possible involvement in past violent crime, but no evidence of threatening conduct during the
seizure, did not create reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Davis, 400 P.3d 994, 999 (Or.
Ct. App. 2017) (evidence of past drug use, without “something more,” is insufficient to create
reasonable suspicion of current drug crime). Thus, the facts known to Officer Dunham and
Officer Taylor at the time of the second two seizures did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of
drug-related criminal activity.
Lastly, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of injury to a child based on the
facts. The relevant provisions of injury to a child require the person causing the alleged injury or
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endangerment of the child to have "care or custody" of the child. LC. § 18-1501(1); see also
State v. Kraly, 164 Idaho 67, 70 (2018) (defining "care or custody"). There was no evidence of
Ms. Showen's care or custody of the teenage girl. She was not the girl's parent or guardian, she
did not have a special relationship with the girl, and she did not assume a duty of care for the
girl. Kraly, 164 Idaho at 70. It was error for the officers, and the district court, to believe that the
totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion of injury to a child. Even if the
officers' mistake of law was objectively reasonable, it does not validate their unlawful seizure of
Ms. Showen to avoid suppression of the evidence. See State v. Petit, 162 Idaho 849, 853-55
(Ct. App. 2017) (holding officer's mistake of law was objectively reasonable, but nonetheless did
not prevent suppression under Idaho Constitution and Idaho's refusal to the adopt good faith
exception). Therefore, Ms. Showen's admission to past drug use did not provide enough facts
and inferences to permit reasonable suspicion of injury to a child.
In sum, the district court erred by ruling the officers had "reasonable suspicion that a
crime could have occurred or could be occurring based on" Ms. Showen's response "in the
home." (Tr., p.68, Ls.6-10.) The officers never had articulable and particularized suspicion to
seize Ms. Showen because she had no connection to the welfare check and her admission to past
drug use did not create reasonable suspicion of any other criminal activity. Therefore, the
officers' seizure of Ms. Showen was unlawful.

E.

The District Court Should Have Suppressed The Evidence Found In Ms. Showen's Purse
Because The Unlawful Seizure Invalidated Her Consent To Search
Because the officers had unlawfully seized Ms. Showen when she consented to the search

3

The district court found that it "couldn't hear that" on Officer Taylor's body cam video.
(Tr., p.64, Ls.14-15.) Neither officer testified to Ms. Showen's date of use.
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of her purse, her consent was invalid, and the evidence found in her purse must be suppressed.
"A consent to search given during an illegal detention is tainted by the illegality and is therefore
invalid." State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2008); see also State v. Cardenas, 143
Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2006) (same); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002)
(same); State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532, 535 (Ct. App. 2000) (same) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at
507-08). Ms. Showen's consent was given during the illegal seizure and, as such, was tainted by
the illegality. (See Tr., p.14, L.25-p.15, L.4, p.66, Ls.14-22; State's Ex. 1, 9:58-10:02.) Due to
the unlawful seizure and subsequently invalid consent, the district court should have granted
Ms. Showen's motion to suppress. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 652 (evidence obtained after consent
to search during unlawfully prolonged detention must be suppressed); see also Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional police
conduct subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11 (same).

CONCLUSION
Ms. Showen respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's order denying her
motion to suppress, vacate the district court's judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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